Kevin Gray,Kafumu Kalyalya | : In this paper we challenge the role of consent in the global order by discussing current modes of international law making in the global order. We contend that the features of state consent in international law depart substantially from those assumed by theorists of the liberal order, who subscribe, in most cases, to the realist conception of state action. We argue, against those theorists, that state consents to coercive measures, and the state’s role in carrying (...) them out, has ceased to be central to an account of global law. We conclude that international law—often thought of as law beyond the state—now has expanded its scope to reach individuals and corporations, and that this change has important ramifications for theories of global justice. | : Dans cet article, nous interrogeons le rôle de l’accord dans l’ordre global en discutant les modes courants de constitution des lois internationales au sein de cet ordre. Nous prétendons que les fonctions de l’accord étatique en loi internationale s’écartent substantiellement de celles assumées par les théoriciens de l’ordre libéral, qui souscrivent, dans la plupart des cas, à la conception réaliste de l’action étatique. Contre ces théoriciens, nos posons que l’État consent à des mesures coercitives, et que le rôle de l’État d’effectuer celles-ci a cessé d’être central dans l’explication de la loi globale. Nous concluons que la loi internationale – souvent pensée comme une loi hors de l’État – a maintenant étendu son spectre jusqu’aux individus et corporations, et que ce changement a d’importantes ramifications que les théories globales de la justice devraient considérer. (shrink)

This paper argues that cosmopolitan law has been more successfully achieved not by appeal to a supra-state authority or community, but by the development of features of existing treaty law. Specifically, it shows how the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction over serious human rights violations has been extended to the citizens and territories of non-member states – and even to otherwise immune state officials – not by challenging the sovereignty of non-member states directly, but on the basis of member states’ own (...) territorial sovereignty and the universal jurisdiction which they delegate to the Court and to the United Nations Security Council. In light of this, the authors argue that cosmopolitanism is better conceived not as invoking an independent sense of global community that supersedes and constrains state sovereignty, but as an immanent, contingent and creative development of statist criminal law itself, rooted in its principles of state sovereignty. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the difficult relationship between Rawls, religion and the values that religious believers might consider important in order to lead the good life. Contrary to many of Rawls’ defenders, I argue that at least some of the values that religious citizens are likely to hold cannot be accounted for under Rawls’ theory or under his conception of the good life. I argue that the model of goods which Rawls takes to be part of a thin theory (...) of the good is tied to his belief that under the Original Position justice can be derived from calculations of self-interest alone. To perform my critique, I consider the paradigmatic case of honour in so-called traditional societies. I argue that the way Rawls thematizes primary goods in A Theory of Justice , including concepts like esteem, cannot account for the way honour manifests itself inside traditional communities. I conclude the paper by considering how Rawls might be able to defend his theory against my objection, by considering the relationship between Rawls’ theory, and the rationalization and secularization of society. (shrink)

Taking Habermas’s Die nachholende Revolution as a foil, I contend that in his discussions of 1989, Habermas has misunderstood the nature of the anti-Communist revolutions. Comparing them to his writings on the public sphere and the student protest movements in Germany, I argue that the revolutions do not represent the triumph of capitalism anymore than they represent the triumph of Western democracy. Calling the events catch-up revolutions is to frame the events as the expansion of modernity and nothing more. Rather, (...) the revolutions show that the revolutionaries in Eastern Europe were grappling with the same problem, namely the control of technical subsystems, that the students and revolutionaries of 1968 were. Viewed in the light of Habermas’s writings from the 1960s, we end up better understanding the twin extremes of capitalism and bureaucratic-totalitarianism. (shrink)